Crop Insurance Savings Accounts: A Viable Alternative to Crop Insurance?
Crop insurance is a critical risk management tool for farmers to protect against yield and revenue losses, smooth income over time, and remain a viable operation after catastrophic events.
However, designing crop insurance instruments that achieve broad participation among farmers at a low cost to the Federal government has proven to be a formidable challenge. Agricultural production and prices are highly volatile and the correlation between historic and future outcomes is quite limited due to weather variability, unforeseen pest problems, frequent changes in technology and market globalization. As a consequence, it is difficult for both the insurer and the producer to accurately assess the level of yield and revenue risk associated with a particular farm operation. As exemplified by Ramirez and Carpio (2011) , the inability of either party to ascertain what the actuarially fair premium is within a reasonable margin of error limits farmer participation unless the overall premium levels are highly subsidized. As a result, achieving broad participation in crop insurance programs has proven costly to the Federal government.
In 2010, between 83% and 91% of the total plantings for each of the four major US field crops (corn, cotton, soybeans and wheat) accounting for over 190 million acres were insured by farmers. To achieve these high levels of participation, on average, the government had to subsidize about 50% of the effective premiums at a cost of $36.5 billion during the last ten years.
In addition, the government paid nearly $12 billion on administrative and operating (A&O) expenses to the private companies in charge of implementing the program (table 1) . For fiscal year 2011, the premium subsidy surged to $7.4 billion plus another $1.4 billion in A&O costs, and it is estimated that subsidy levels in excess of $15 billion will be needed for 2012.
During the last 20 years, numerous studies have been conducted with the objective of improving the actuarial performance of the Federal crop insurance program through several different avenues. Some have considered alternative forms of area yield insurance (e.g., Miranda 1991; Skees, Black, and Barnett 1997; Goodwin and Ker 1998; Mahul 1999; Ker and Goodwin 2000) and revenue insurance (Gray, Richardson and McClaskey 1995; Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes 1997; Stokes 2000; Wang et al. 1998; and Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga 2000) . Others have focused on developing improved methods for the Risk Management Agency (RMA) to more accurately assess and price yield and revenue risks (e.g., Barry, Goodwin and Ker 1998; Moss and Shonkwiler 1993; Ramirez 1997 Ramirez , 2000 Ramirez, Misra, and Nelson 2003; Ramirez, Carpio, and Rejesus 2009; and Ramirez and Carpio 2011) . In spite of those studies, as previously noted, the need for high government subsidies remains and in fact appears to be increasing (table 1) . Given the pressing need to bring the Federal budget deficit under control over the next decade, it is important to explore the viability of less costly alternatives to help farmers manage their yield and revenue risks.
A second unresolved issue that has affected the US crop insurance program for many years has been complaints from farmers, producer organizations and legislators about the rating structure not being fair across crops, cropping systems, and geographical regions. This could also be a result of the insurer's inability to accurately determine what the actuarially correct rates are in each particular situation and the producers themselves not being able to ascertain what they should be paying. Nevertheless, there is discontent about the program supposedly delivering substantial benefits to some participating producers while being ineffective in providing a safety net for others. This debate was exacerbated during the recent Farm Bill negotiations where direct payments are supposed to be replaced by expanding the role and breadth of Crop Insurance.
back to 1996 -a system based upon farmer owned savings accounts. Surprisingly, despite a plethora of savings account based proposals, few analyses of the viability of such systems have been conducted. Reports such as Dismukes and Durst (2006) , Enahoro and Gloy (2006) , and Gloy and Cheng (2006) using tax records to analyze Farm and Ranch Risk Management (FARRM) and counter cyclical (CC) savings accounts have presented a mixed picture on the potential of such approaches.
Building upon this earlier work, this study explores a related alternative design based on the establishment of what we refer to as crop insurance savings accounts (CISAs). Our proposed CISA system, which has similarities to programs for health insurance (Health Savings Accounts) and unemployment insurance (Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts) (Feldstein and Altman 1998) , is designed to closely mimic current revenue insurance policies that are now so familiar to farmers, but using a personal savings account approach. The system would enable producers to annually deposit pre-tax income in an interest-bearing personal savings account and draw an indemnity from their accounts when there is a qualified loss. If in a given year a farmer's account is exhausted, the government would lend money to the account to cover the indemnity.
The proposed design should exhibit minimal moral hazard and adverse selection problems. As well, under the CISA system, farm-level risk would no longer have to be priced, thus eliminating the premium rating difficulties that weaken actuarial soundness and trigger the need for substantial external subsidies. In addition, administrative costs should be relatively small.
CISA Program Design
In this section we formalize the basic framework of our proposed crop insurance savings account system. The design and language of the CISA system we present is analogous in many ways to current revenue insurance instruments, which, on a premium basis, accounts for three-quarters of all policies (Shields 2010) . Under the proposed system farmers are allowed to annually save a specified fraction of their historic farm revenue in an individually owned crop insurance savings account that earns an interest rate . We denote the contribution made to a farmer's CISA in period as where is some average of past revenue levels, (e.g., a simple average of the previous five years of revenue), and is the proportion of contributed to the CISA. These investments are assumed to be with pre-tax income.
Withdraws from the account are made when farm revenues in a given year fall below a pre-specified threshold. Using the language of current revenue insurance programs, we call this threshold revenue level the "revenue guarantee" and denote it as . Hence, withdraws from the CISA in a given year are equal to . In the event that a farmer's CISA balance is insufficient to cover a withdrawal, the required funds are lent to the account by the government at the same interest rate as earned on the savings. Given this structure, the periodic balance of an individual's CISA, , and their periodic after-tax income from farming, , can be expressed as:
where is the tax rate and are farm production costs.
To improve upon the contribution scheme presented in equation (1) Additionally, our policy design includes catch-up contributions for individuals with a negative CISA balance. That is, farmers who have a negative balance, and hence have borrowed money from the government, are required to temporarily contribute a higher percentage of their revenue than the pre-specified rate ( ). For example, if the contribution rate for a particular guarantee level is set at 3% of past average revenue, individuals with a negative CISA balance would have to contribute an additional share of their future revenues on top of the 3% until they reach a positive balance. In order to ensure that farmers are not unduly burdened by these extraordinary contributions, the catch-up payments only have to be made in years when the actual revenue exceeds their past 5-year moving average. When combined, these two (upper cap and catch-up) features help steer the periodical inflows to the accounts towards what is needed to sustain the selected revenue guarantee level. In other words, they help keep the system actuarially sound even if the pre-specified contribution rate ( ) turns out to be too high or two low. 
To summarize, individuals who have revenues above their pre-specified revenue guarantee withdraw no funds from their account and make the normal contribution as long as they are below the CISA cap threshold. If they have a negative balance, they additionally make a catch-up contribution. Farmers that have revenues below their revenue guarantee make the normal contribution to their CISA and withdraw an indemnity from their account of to cover their losses.
Akin to a traditional individual retirement account (IRA), positive balances in CISAs may be withdrawn after retirement from farming or bequeathed to heirs in the event of death. For farmers who have a positive account balance and expect the account to be positive at retirement, participation in the CISA system does not induce a distortionary effect on risk taking activities (i.e., no moral hazard) because the cost of such activities is fully internalized. This is a distinct advantage of the CISA system over the current insurance instruments.
For individuals who reach retirement with a negative CISA balance two alternative policy designs are possible, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. One alternative is for the government to forgive the debt. This has two clear disadvantages. First, there is a cost to the government in the form of foregone loan repayments and a benefit for those farmers who are more inclined to take risks and thus are more likely to end with a negative CISA balance.
Second, for farmers who at some point begin to expect having a negative terminal period balance this creates a moral hazard problem in which they do not face the full consequences of taking on greater risks. On the positive side, if upon retirement producers get to withdraw the positive ending balances without paying taxes, any terminal debts are forgiven, and the alternative is no subsidized insurance, it is expected that most farmers would voluntarily choose to participate.
The second alternative approach for managing negative balances upon retirement is to require repayment of the debt in the form of an added tax when the land is sold, leased or transferred to heirs. The advantages of this design are two-fold. First, it would result in less financial burden on the government. Second, it would not induce any moral hazard problems.
The main downside to this approach is that participation would be expected to be lower than in the first alternative where terminal debts are forgiven.
Feasibility of the CISA System
The viability of the proposed crop insurance system rests squarely on one issue: the proportion of farmers that will reach retirement with a negative account balance. If for a given revenue guarantee level, , there is a reasonable CISA contribution rate, , at which a vast majority of farmers are expected to reach retirement with a positive account balance, then the proposed system could have several obvious advantages relative to the current program. Specifically, the CISA system would likely (a) achieve a high level of voluntary participation because of the tax free savings, automatic access to low-interest government loans to cover burdensome revenue shortfalls, and final withdrawal benefit, (b) substantially reduce the cost to the government through much lower administrative expenses and eliminating or drastically curtailing the need This is the empirical question we focus on in the next sections.
Simulation Methods
Given the procedures to be followed in this research, records. The -0.45 yield-price correlation is based on the average of the sample correlation coefficients observed between those yield series and the state-wide price data during the period those yields were observed.
CISA Performance Analysis
This section assesses the potential performance of the proposed CISA system with capped balances and catch-up contributions for the particular case of corn producers in the State of Illinois, with a focus on three key measures: (1) The proportion of farmers who require loans from the government at some point in time ( ), (2) the proportion of farmers who have a negative terminal balance ( ), and (3) the cost of the program to the government. In each simulation the periodic revenue of a population of 10,000 farmers over 45 years is generated using the draws from the yield and price simulation algorithm described in Appendix II. In the analysis we assume that the regular annual CISA contribution by each farmer is a fraction ( ) of his or her average revenue over the previous five years. While in practice it may be beneficial to allow farmers to build up an initial balance in their CISA account before transitioning from a traditional crop insurance program, this is not done in our simulations, in order to deliver a worse case scenario assessment of the proposed CISA system.
Simulations under Baseline Parameters
Using the estimated model parameters and procedures for simulating future yields and prices discussed in Appendix II, table 2 presents summary statistics for the performance of the CISA system over a range of contribution rates and revenue guarantees. All numbers presented are averages over 100,000 simulated populations of 10,000 farmers each. We consider five regular contribution rates ( ) equal to 1%, 3%, 5%, 7%, or 9% of a farmer's 5-year revenue moving average as well as three different revenue guarantee rates ( ) that are 65%, 75%, or 85% of that moving average ( ). The account caps are then set equal to the revenue guarantee level selected by the producer, i.e. . This allows farmers to build up account balances to a level where they can fully cover a CISA withdrawal in a catastrophic year with a 100% crop loss. terminal CISA balance and those with a negative terminal balance. This facilitates comparing the expected terminal balances for these two categories and assessing the potential liabilities of the government when farmers retire.
As expected, the performance of the CISA system varies substantially across the different contribution and revenue guarantee rate combinations. For high contribution rates and low revenue guarantees very few farmers ever require a loan from the government to cover a withdrawal from their account and virtually none end farming with a negative terminal balance.
For example, at a 9% contribution rate with a 65% revenue guarantee, the simulations indicate that only 2.85% of farmers would ever have a negative CISA balance and less than 0.005%
would end with a negative balance. In the reverse case of a very low contribution rate of 1% and a high revenue guarantee of 85%, nearly all farmers will at some point need a loan from the government and over half would end with a negative balance. that, although the effective crop insurance premiums are heavily subsidized by the government, they are not that much lower than the CISA contributions. In fact, if comparable subsidy levels were to be provided for CISA, the required contributions would decline to $6.90, $10.80 and $17.62. In addition, the previous results were obtained without assuming a build-up period prior to initiating the CISA and do not account for the reduction in the amount of yield and price risk that farmers would be willing to take if self-insurance were their only protection against that risk.
Finally, for the small percentage of farmers predicted to end with a negative CISA, the terminal balance that would be owed to the government is relatively small ($85, $96, $96 per acre).
Sensitivity Analysis
Given the robustness of the datasets and the methods used to estimate the price and yield distributions underpinning the previous analyses, we feel fairly confident of the validity of the results for a typical Midwestern corn farm. However, it is possible that the performance of the proposed CISA system might not be as appealing for farms that are exposed to a substantially higher revenue risk. To test the system under extreme conditions, we focus our sensitivity analysis on a scenario where both price and yield volatility are markedly higher. Specifically, the standard deviation of the price distribution is increased by 25% and the standard deviations of the yield distributions are increased by 50%. CISA is to protect farmers from infrequent losses (e.g., those that occur 5 or 6 out of 40 years), it appears that the required contribution level is not much affected by how volatile revenues (i.e., prices and yields) are. This suggests that as long as coverage levels are reasonably defined in terms of the frequency of loss they are designed to protect (e.g., 5, 10 or 15 out of 100 years) the proposed CISA system could provide effective coverage at affordable annual contributions regardless of how volatile a crop's revenues are.
Why would CISA be better than Crop Insurance?
A final obvious question is why would CISA be a more effective safety net than the current crop insurance program? The explanation rests on the previous evidence about the impact that premium estimation inaccuracy has on the actuarial performance of crop insurance. Specifically, Ramirez and Carpio (2012) show that, under rational producer behavior, premium estimation inaccuracy can solely explain the substantial subsidies that have been required to keep the program operating. Because of insurer and producer uncertainty about what the actuarially fair premium is, without subsidies, many farmers would feel that they are being overcharged and thus not participate. Under the simplifying assumption that a producer would only purchase coverage if he or she thinks that the premium quoted by the insurer is fair or better, and moderate levels of uncertainty, substantial subsidies are needed to achieve high participation rates. For example, to reach 95% enrollment, all estimated premiums would have to be proportionally subsidized to the extent that they seem favorable to 95% of the producers. To the last producer entering the program, the premium quoted by the insurer might seem just right. Many others would think they are getting a bargain, and in most cases they would be. In fact, the end result of this scheme is that all but the last individual receive subsidies in excess of what is needed to entice participation.
An additional related problem is the resulting distribution of the subsidies across producers. As detailed in Appendix I (to be posted on-line only for interested readers to access), under moderate levels of uncertainty about the actuarially fair premium value, it is quite likely that a producer receives more than twice as much premium payment support from the government as another "identical" operator. For example, assume that the actuarially fair premium is $20/acre but the insurer estimates it at $14/acre for one and $26/acre for the other. At a 50% level of government subsidization, these two farmers would be offered rates of $7/acre and $13/acre, respectively. Because of the high subsidization, both are likely to conclude that this is a good deal and participate in the program. However, although they have an identical risk profile, one would be receiving a subsidy that is nearly twice as high as the other. Alternatively assume that the actuarially fair premium for one producer is $16/acre and $24/acre for the other, but the insurer estimates them both to be $20/acre and offers a subsidized premium rate of $10/acre. Again one would be receiving a subsidy that is more than twice as high as the other.
In contrast, under the proposed CISA, since the producers would own and be paid interest on the contributions they make to their accounts and those contributions are tax-deductible, they are more likely to participate even if the required contribution rate is substantially higher than what they think it should be for the account to end with a positive balance. In addition, the cap feature would prevent the accumulated contributions from becoming excessive relative to what is necessary for self-insurance. On the other hand, if the required contribution rate turns out to lower than what was needed, the catch-up feature would trigger more often and keep the balance from staying negative for too long.
In short, the reason why CISA could work at rates similar to those offered by crop insurance and without external subsidies is that it eliminates the need for unnecessary random "excess" payments to a substantial percentage of the producers. However, there is always the alternative to provide a similar level of subsidy to the account contributions as to Crop Insurance, which would make CISA extremely appealing to most farmers. The cap feature would prevent the total amount of subsidy provided to any particular account from becoming excessive relative to what is necessary for self-insurance and the distribution of the subsidy across producers would likely be much more homogeneous and need-based than under Crop Insurance.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the results offer a promising outlook on the viability of the proposed CISA system provided that revenue guarantee levels and contribution rates can be appropriately matched to ensure that only a small percentage of the CISA accounts end up with a negative terminal balance and that the farmers can afford the necessary contribution levels. Since, as proposed, the per acre CISA cost should be a fraction of what the government is currently spending subsidizing crop insurance, more favorable terms (such as matched contributions or subsidizing an initial buildup period) could be consider.
In addition, even if some level of matching to the contributions is provided, the lingering concerns and criticisms about unfair rating and the unequal distribution of the crop insurance benefits and subsidies across crops, cropping systems and geographical regions would likely be alleviated. Because of this, it might make sense to at least establish a CISA system as an optional pilot alternative to crop insurance. Finally, although this is not investigated in the study, it is expected that the administrative complexity and burden associated with implementing the proposed CISA system would also be less than that of the crop insurance program. For instance, 
Appendix I
This appendix is comprised of two sections. The first section entitled "Yield Variability and Premium Estimation Error" establishes a range of plausible levels of crop insurance premium estimation error corresponding to typical corn production scenarios in the Midwestern US. The second section entitled "Distribution of Crop Insurance Subsidies" assesses the potential impact of such levels of premium estimation error on the distribution of the Crop Insurance subsidies across participating corn producers.
Yield Variability and Premium Estimation Error
The yield simulation scenarios are designed to resemble the case of corn production in the Midwestern US. Specifically, prototypical farms yields with a mean of 180 bushels/acre and standard deviations ranging from 30 to 50 bushels/acre are simulated. In the first part of the analysis (Scenario A), yields are assumed to be normally distributed. At the lowest standard deviation of 30 bushels/acre the probability of a yield value under 130 bushels/acre or over 230 bushels/acre is only 10% (5% under and 5% over). This would have to be a superior farmer with limited downside and substantial upside yield potential. At the highest standard deviation of 50 bushels/acre the 5% probability bounds are 97.5 and 262.5 bushels/acre. This could be farmer with a fair downside but an unrealistically high upside yield potential.
In the second part of the analysis (Scenario B), yields are assumed to follow a substantially left skewed SU distribution (Ramirez, Carpio and Rejesus 2011) . At the lowest standard deviation of 30 bushels/acre and skewness and kurtosis values of -3.25 and 23.5, the 5% probability boundaries are 125 and 207 bushels/acre (Figure 1 ). These expand to 88.5 and 225 bushels/acre at the highest standard deviation of 50 bushels/acre (Figure 2) . In other words, the upside yield potential from the mean of 180 bushels/acre less than half as much as the downside potential. It is believed that these distributions are more consistent with the likely behavior of farm-level corn yields in the Midwestern US. discarded values divided by 10 million is thus the expected indemnity associated with that specific yield distribution and, therefore, the actuarially fair premium that needs to be charged.
In the case of the normal distributions ( The situation is not much different when the yield distribution is assumed to be leftskewed (Table 1) . Under this distributional assumption, at the 65% coverage level a producer who is able to maintain a 5% lower bound of 125 bushels/acre (Figure 1 ) should only pay a $7.14/acre premium. In contrast, a farmer whose 5% lower-bound is 88.5 bushels/acre (Figure 2) should be charged $21.17/acre. Unfortunately again, because of the limited amount of yield data available for participating producers, it is impossible to reliably estimate the correct location of the far left tail of the yield distribution and, as shown in the next section, errors of this magnitude might not be uncommon.
The distribution of the estimated premiums under any given yield distribution can be obtained by simulation methods as well. Specifically, 10,000 small samples of size n=20 are drawn from the underlying distribution and the distributional parameters are estimated based on each sample. In the case of a normal, the usual estimates for the mean and standard deviation are utilized. In the case of an SU, Maximum Likelihood methods are used to estimate the four distributional parameters . Once the parameter estimates corresponding to each of the 10,000 samples are available, the same procedure utilized to compute the actuarially fair premiums (AFP) is applied to obtain premium estimates. Those 10,000 premium estimates represent (i.e. are draws from) the statistical distribution of the estimated premiums associated with that particular yield distribution.
Key summary statistics describing the distribution of the premium estimates corresponding to each the 10 assumed yield distributions are presented in Tables 1 and 2 . In the case of an underlying normal with a mean of 180 and a standard deviation of 40 bushels/acre, the average of the 10,000 premium estimates (labeled as APE in Table 1 ) at 65% coverage is $5.71/acre versus the AFP of $4.93/acre. In other words, the premium estimates exhibit a 16% upward bias in this particular instance. In addition, the average of the absolute differences between the estimated premiums and the AFP (labeled as MAD in Table 1 ) is $3.08/acre. This means that premium estimates that are several dollars apart from the AFP of $4.93/acre are fairly common, with a strong tendency for the estimates to be higher rather than lower than the AFP.
When the underlying yield distribution is an SU with the same mean (180 bushels/acre) and standard deviation (40 bushels/acre), the APE is $14.70/acre versus the AFP of $13.70/acre, and the MAD stands at $8.02/acre. This means that premium estimates that are more than 50% lower or higher than the AFP are fairly common. The column labeled PMAD (percentage MAD)
in Table 1 is obtained by multiplying the MAD by 100 and dividing by the AFP, which expresses it as a percentage of the AFP. Note that, in all cases, the PMAD decreases with the coverage level and when the yield distribution has a higher standard deviation. Generally on a relative basis the MAD is lower at higher AFP. At the most common 65% coverage level, the PMAD ranges from 98.5 to 48.1 percent for the normal and 78.1 to 46.9 percent for the SU distributions.
While the yield distributions underlying the previously discussed bias and PMAD statistics are hypothetical in nature, they are by no means unrealistic representations of possible corn production scenarios in the Midwest. Nevertheless, more conservative (25 to 50 percent) PMAD values are assumed for the following analyses.
Distribution of Crop Insurance Subsidies
While it is not claimed that the previously discussed PMAD and bias magnitudes are characteristic of the RMA premium estimates for corn production in the Midwestern US, in this section they will be used to explore the potential impacts of such levels of premium estimation inaccuracy on the distribution of crop insurance subsidies across farmers who produce the same crop and (unknown to the insurer) exhibit identical yield risk profiles. Specifically, it is assumed that both the farmer and the insurer do not know what the AFP is and thus have to estimate it with various degrees of error (PMAD and bias). The producer and insurer premium estimates are denoted by PPE and IPE, respectively, and producers may be willing to pay a risk-protection premium (RPP) in excess of their PPE. A farmer's decision rule for participating in the program, thus, is PPE+RPP≥IPE, i.e. that his/her own premium estimate plus any risk protection premium he/she is willing to pay is greater than the insurer's quote.
For each scenario in the analysis, it is assumed that 10,000 identical producers are eligible to participate in the program. Alternatively, this could be interpreted as conducting repeated outcome draws for a single producer. Each outcome (i) is characterized by a set of two premium estimates, one by the producer (PPE i ) and one by the insurer (IPE i ), which are randomly drawn as follows:
where AFP=10 in all cases, PPB and IPB are the biases in the producer and insurer premium estimates, respectively, and U iP and U iI are draws from uncorrelated uniform distributions with zero mean and whatever range is necessary to achieve the desired PMAD for PPE and IPE.
In the first scenario (S1a) presented in Table 2 it is assumed that IPB, PPB and RPP are all zero and that both the PPE and the IPE exhibit a relatively low PMAD of 30%. Thus, both U iP and U iI are set range between -6 and 6 which means that the premium estimates will range from 4 to 16 in both cases. Since the estimated premiums are not subsidized (Government Subsidy Rate=GSR=0 in Table 2 ) in this scenario, as expected, PPE i ≥IPE i in just about 50% of the 10,000 simulated outcomes, which means that only half of the eligible producers would voluntarily participate (Producer Participation Rate= PPR=0.50). A more interesting question, however, is:
what is the distribution of the premiums paid by the participating producers relative to the AFP, i.
e. to what they should in fact be paying?
This question can be answered by comparing their IPE i (i.e. what they ended up paying) with the AFP. As detailed in Table 2 , in this scenario, over 25% of participating producers end up paying more than the AFP (i.e. what they should pay) while 16% pays less than half of the AFP. In addition, because only farmers for whom PPE i ≥IPE i participate in the program and there is no RPP or any positive bias on the producer's premium estimate, the sum of their IPE i (i.e.
what they actually pay) is only 80.0% of the sum of their AFP, which means that this particular scheme could not operate without a substantial external subsidy. Thus, PPG (the Percentage Paid by Government) equals 0.20 in Table 2 .
In practice, the RMA provides subsidized premiums to promote higher levels of participation. Mathematically, this alters the participation rule to PPE i ≥(1-GSR)xIPE i where GSR is the government subsidy rate. For instance, if GSR=0.50 (50 percent), the insurer's quote would be 0.50x IPE i . The second scenario (S1b) presented in Table 2 maintains the baseline assumptions of S1a (IPB=0, PPB=0, RPP=0, and PMAD=30%) but assumes a GSR of 52% which is roughly in line with what has been observed in recent years. In this case PPE i ≥0.50xIPE i in 9,020 of the 10,000 cases, i.e. the producer participation rate (PPR) is 90.2 percent. The sum of 0.50xIPE i for the participating producers is only 46.2% of the sum of their AFP, which means that 53.8% of the total indemnity payments would have to be externally subsidized. Thus, PPG=0.538 in Table 2 .
In addition note that, because of the high overall subsidy level, all participating producers now pay less than 80% of what is actuarially fair. However, while over 20% are charged 30% or less, on the other extreme, nearly 25% pay 60% or more of the AFP. That is, just by chance, two producers with identical yield risk profiles would often end up paying very different crop insurance premiums and thus receiving vastly disproportionate shares of the intended government subsidy. Table 2 presents several other scenarios involving various plausible combinations of premium estimate biases, PMADs and risk protection premiums, as well as the possibility of a substantial correlation (CORR) between the insurance and producer premium estimates. At least some degree of correlation should be expected since the RMA considers the farm's recent yield history on its rating protocol and the farmer could give some weight to the insurer's quote when determining what he/she thinks the actuarially fair premium might be. The scenarios are designed to approximately resemble the current program outcomes, specifically a 90% producer participation rate (PPR) given a 50% external premium subsidy (PPG).
Note that, in all the 90% participation (i.e. "b") scenarios, the 25% of the producers paying the highest premiums pay at least twice as much as the 25% paying the lowest premiums.
In S6b, for example, 26.1% pay less than 30% of the AFP while 24.5% pay more than 70% of the AFP. In other words, just by chance, 26.1% of the farmers end up receiving a subsidy of at least 70% while 24.5% get a rate subsidy of 30% or less. Further, 14.8% receive a subsidy of at least 80% while 11.0% get 20% or less.
Numerous other scenarios are explored involving exhaustive combinations of producer and insurer PMADs, bias, RRP and CC. From these scenarios it is concluded that while some such combinations result in a high percentage of producers participating at relatively low levels of external subsidy (GSR and PPG), as long as a non-negligible PMAD (≥2.0) is assumed to be associated with the insurer's estimate for the AFP, the dispersion of the premiums to be paid by "identical" farmers remains high. It can thus be argued that this is an unavoidable disadvantage of crop insurance. While, through substantial external subsidies, it is possible to avoid a situation where too many farmers end up paying more than the AFP, it appears that the distribution of those subsidies across participating farmers will always be highly and randomly uneven. Just by chance, some producers will receive a large share of the subsidy while others get very little or possibly even none at all.
In order to facilitate comparisons, the previous analysis focus on the case of a set producers with identical risk profiles. However, a logical extrapolation of the above results is that an individual with a low-risk operation (i.e. whose AFP is relatively low) could very well end up paying a similar or even larger premium than another high-risk farmer. An alternative, of course, would be for the insurer to charge the same "average" premium to all producers whose operations appear to face about the same yield risk. The problem with this is that, because of the previously illustrated difficulties with accurately assessing farm-level risk (i.e. estimating the AFP), producers with substantially different risk exposure (i.e. AFP) could end up paying the same "average" premium. Notes: GSR, PPR, PPG, stand for the Government Subsidy Rate to each individually estimated premium, the Producer Participation Rate in the program, and the Percentage (of the total program indemnities) Paid by the Government. The percentages on the first column under PAFP are the percentages of the AFP. The numbers in the columns next to them are to be interpreted as follows: on the second column, for example, there is a 100% probability that the producer will end up paying more than 40% of the AFP, a 91.9% probability that he/she will pay more than 45% of the AFP, an 84.0% probability that he/she will pay more than 50% of the AFP, and so on. Therefore, the "test-of-concept" analyses presented in this article are conducted for the specific case of corn producers in the State of Illinois.
Price and Yield Distribution Models
In addition to having access to suitable data, a key to obtaining realistic estimates of the price and yield distributions of interest is to use flexible probability density function (pdf) models that can accommodate a wide range of mean-variance-skewness-kurtosis combinations. One such density function is the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS), which was first utilized for yield modeling and simulation by Ramirez (1997) . Subsequent applications of this model involving both yield and price distributions include Ramirez and Somarriba (2000) , , and Ramirez, McDonald and Carpio (2010) .
In addition to its flexibility, the IHS distribution model is appealing because each of its first four statistical moments can be independently controlled by a parameter or a parametric , where (6) .
In short, the IHS model allows for a wide range of skewness-kurtosis combinations (according to the two equations above which only depend on and ) while its mean and variance are determined by and only. In addition, Ramirez, Misra and Nelson (2003) show how the IHS density (equation 1) can be modified to allow for autocorrelation.
Specifically, all is needed is to let where is the row of a by transformation matrix such that and is the error term correlation matrix (Judge et al. 1985) . Using standard procedures, the concentrated log-likelihood function needed for estimating the parameters of this model can be derived from equation (1):
The above function is then maximized in order to obtain estimates for the parameters of a price distribution model with a time-varying mean, constant variance, skewness and kurtosis coefficients, and a suitable autocorrelation process. Maximum likelihood estimation is accomplished using the CML procedure of Gauss 9. The data utilized includes the real (inflationadjusted 2 ) corn prices received by Illinois farmers during the last 70 years (USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service 2011). As customary, the price series is first tested and confirmed to be stationary according to both the Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Peron tests.
The maximum-likelihood parameter estimates and related statistics for this first model are presented in The maximum value of the concentrated log-likelihood function corresponding to the non-normal price model is -60.37 versus -64.92 for the analogous normal model where and are set to zero. As a result, the likelihood ratio test statistic easily allows for rejection of the null hypothesis of normality (p-value=0.01). That is, since both and are positive, the distribution of corn prices received by farmers in the state of Illinois is in fact positively kurtotic and significantly right-skewed. Finally it is evident that, over time, prices follow a second order autoregressive process as both parameters in this process ( and in the transformation matrix ) are highly significant while the Box-Pierce test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the transformed model residuals are independently distributed (p-value=0.978). As described in the next section, this model can be used to obtain draws from the current and future price distributions for the purposes of the CISA analyses.
Farm-level yield models are also estimated using the previously described procedures, assuming that there is no autocorrelation. The data in this case is obtained from the University of Illinois Endowment Farms project. Specifically, their ten farms with the largest sample sizes (40 to 45 years) are selected for inclusion in the analyses. The maximum-likelihood parameter estimates and related statistics for these 10 yield distribution models are presented in table 2.
First note that all yields are increasing over time, with the rate of increase averaging about 1.4 bushels/acre per year. The predicted yields for 2011, presented in the first row of the estimates suggests that the yield distributions tend to be left-skewed. Two of the non-rejection instances might be explained by the fact that, in both cases, observations were missing for the year 1983 which was characterized by extremely low yields in most other farms. In the other two, it appears that somehow farmers managed to avoid an extremely low yield event during the observation period, which is needed to trigger rejection.
Price and Yield Simulation
The process of simulating draws from an estimated IHS pdf is simplified by the fact that the IHS random variable is actually defined as a function of a normal (Ramirez 1997) . Specifically, if Z t is a standard normal, then: 
